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China has emerged as one of the world's leading recipients of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Meanwhile, the successful transition experience of many Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries (CEECs) also enables them to attract an increasing share of global foreign 
investment, particularly from the European Union (EU). What is the relationship between 
inward FDI of China and the CEECs?  We conceptualize the relationship according to 
three alternative paradigms:  1) China and the CEECs each exist in its own regional pro-
duction network, with no linkage between FDI flows into China and into CEECs; 2) China 
and the CEECs together comprise a global production network, so that FDI into China is 
positively related to FDI into CEECs; and 3) FDI  into China is a substitute for FDI into 
the CEECs, so that the correlation between them is negative. In this paper, we employ pan-
el data to study this issue in detail. Specifically, we compare empirical estimates for 15 
CEECs over the 15-year period 1990-2004 using four different econometric approaches: 
FGLS with Random effects, FGLS with fixed effects, EC2SLS and GMM. 
The result supports the conclusion that China's inward FDI does not crowd out 
CEECs' inward FDI. In fact, it shows that in some circumstances FDI flows in these two 
regions are moderately complementary. In addition, our analysis confirms the importance 
for FDI flows of recipient-country characteristics such as market size, degree of trade libe-
ralization and labor quality, as well as a healthy global capital market. 
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China and Central and Eastern European Countries: Re-
gional networks, global supply chain or international com-




Kiinasta on tullut yksi maailman suurimmista suorien ulkomaisten sijoitusten vastaanotta-
jamaista. Keski- ja Itä-Euroopan (KIE) maiden menestyksekäs taloudellinen siirtymävaihe 
on auttanut niitäkin kasvattamaan osuuttaan maailmanlaajuisista sijoitusvirroista. Suorat 
sijoitukset EU-maista ovat kasvaneet erityisen nopeasti. Mikä on Kiinan ja KIE-maiden 
suorien sijoitusten välinen yhteys? Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tutkitaan kolmea mahdollis-
ta hypoteesia: 1) Kiina ja KIE-maat vaikuttavat omissa tuotantoverkostoissaan, eikä niiden 
saamien suorien sijoitusten välillä ole mitään yhteyttä, 2) Kiina ja KIE-maat ovat osia maa-
ilmanlaajuisessa tuotantoverkostossa, ja niihin tulevilla suorilla sijoituksilla on positiivinen 
korrelaatio ja 3) Kiinan ja KIE-maiden saamat suorat investoinnit ovat toistensa substituut-
teja, eli niiden välinen korrelaatio on negatiivinen. Näitä hypoteeseja tutkitaan tässä työssä 
15 KIE-maan paneelidataa käyttäen. Aineisto kattaa vuodet 1990–2004, ja tutkimuksessa 
käytetään neljää erilaista ekonometrista lähestymistapaa. Tuloksien mukaan Kiinan saamat 
suorat sijoitukset eivät vähennä KIE-maihin tulevia suoria sijoituksia. Näyttää jopa siltä, 
että joissain tapauksissa Kiinan ja KIE-maiden suorat sijoitukset ovat toistensa komple-
mentteja. Suorien sijoitusten virtaan vaikuttavat esimerkiksi vastaanottavan maan markki-
noiden koko, ulkomaankaupan liberalisoinnin aste, työvoiman laatu sekä maailmanlaajuis-
ten pääomamarkkinoiden tilanne.   
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1  Introduction 
 
The past two decades have been the most significant period in the growth of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into China. Starting from a modest base of $3.49 billion in 1990, China's 
FDI inflows expanded rapidly, to a peak of over $44.2 billion in 1998. A further surge ac-
companied China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, 
lifting China to the top ranks as a FDI destination in 2003. In 2005, China's inward FDI 
reached a record high of over $70 billion. 
Governments from other emerging markets are very concerned about this unprece-
dented growth. As they would point out, world FDI grew in the same period at a very 
modest rate. This turn of events suggests the possibility that persistent rapid growth of FDI 
into one country or region (eg China) will eventually hollow out inward FDI shares of oth-
er emerging markets. This potential phenomenon has been dubbed the 'China effect'. Re-
searchers and policymakers from the emerging countries have on various occasions ex-
pressed some concern about the situation,
1 and it is now clear that an empirical analysis 
leading to some convincing results is both urgent and necessary. 
While the recent related literature has focused on the relationship between China 
and other Southeast Asian and Latin American countries, much less attention has been paid 
to regions such as the Central and Eastern Europe. Historically, the European Union (EU) 
has always been the primary source of FDI flows into the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs). At the time when most CEECs were opening their doors to western 
direct investment, after the transition in the early 1990s, the more advanced economies in 
the region (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) were well-positioned to attract large 
inflows of FDI. Their main advantages in this regard include close geographical and cul-
tural ties with traditional EU members as well as initially low wage levels. Meanwhile, as 
remarkable economic progress in Southeast Asia in the 80s and 90s caught the attention of 
the rest of the world (including the EU), an increasing share of world FDI began to flow 
into the region in 1996. China, being the region’s most successful performer in terms of 
economic growth, has become one of the most important host markets for European Union 
FDI. The dramatic increase of FDI into both China and the CEECs raises much concern 
over whether there is an overall substitution or complementary effect on FDI attraction be-K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
Regional networks, global supply chain or international competitors? 
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tween the two regions. In particular, one might wonder whether China’s emergence as a 
top FDI recipient tends to crowd out FDI flows into CEECs. Since both China and CEECs 
have benefited a great deal from FDI inflows over the last two decades, this is apparently 
an issue of great interest to academic scholars and policymakers from both regions. 
As the starting point for our study we take a major insight from the existing litera-
ture on FDI into different emerging market economies, viz. that such FDI is often moti-
vated by the need to facilitate production networks.  We conceptualize our approach by 
considering three alternative scenarios for the relationship between FDI flows into China 
and into the CEECs.  The first is that China itself is only a part of the Asian regional pro-
duction network, so that its inward FDI is not related to the CEECs' inward FDI.  A second 
possibility is that the Chinese and CEEC economies are all parts of a global production 
network, so that FDI into China and into the CEECs are complements.  Lastly, we can take 
the position of multinationals considering China and CEECs to be rival production sites, so 
that FDI into China and into the CEECs are substitutes. 
 The aim of this paper is to investigate our proxy for the impact of China, along 
with other FDI location determinants, within an analytical framework. Using panel data on 
15 CEECs spanning the period from 1990 to 2004, this empirical study tries to shed some 
light on the relationship between the two regions in terms of FDI attraction and broader 
economic cooperation. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a background 
review on FDI development in the two regions. Section 3 describes the data and estimation 
methodology, and Section 4 presents the estimation results. Some robustness checks are 
discussed in section 5, and Section 6 concludes.   
 
 
2  FDI into China and into Central and Eastern Europe 
since 1990 
 
Since it first adopted an open-door policy in 1978, China has experienced several phases in 
inward FDI from the rest of the world (Figure 1). In the first stage, from 1979 to the mid-
1980s, only a parsimonious amount of FDI flowed into the country each year, due to its 
 
1 Chantasasawat et al. (2004) and Eichengreen and Tong (2005) cite several comments by politicians and 
scholars from emerging markets on the threat to FDI inflows posed by China. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




insufficient infrastructure and regulatory obscurity. Later, FDI inflows increased at a fairly 
steady rate until they slumped in 1990 as a result of politically-motivated economic sanc-
tions. It was not until 1992, when then-Chinese-leader Deng Xiaoping toured Shanghai and 
Guangdong carrying a message of renewed commitment to open up the market that the 
value of annual FDI inflows jumped again to a new high of $11.2 billion. This rapid surge 
continued through the following years until it was stemmed again by the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. China has since 2000 regained momentum in attracting FDI. Its accession to 
WTO in 2001 brought a new surge of FDI inflows. Despite a worldwide decline in FDI, 
China continued to gain in global FDI share, overtaking the United States to become the 
world’s second largest FDI destination in the early 2000s. Among those investing in China, 
the major players are the industrialized and newly industrialized countries. Until the mid-
1990s, Hong Kong was the largest source, accounting for more than 50 percent of the na-
tion’s total FDI inflows, followed by Taiwan, the U.S., Japan, Singapore, U.K., South Ko-
rea, Canada and Germany. In recent years, there has been a downward trend in Hong 
Kong's share and increasing shares of other regions, which has made for a more diversified 
pool of FDI into China. Meanwhile, accompanying the double digit growth of the nation’s 
inward FDI are some notable changes in its structure. In the early period, FDI was allowed 
only for a small number of industries largely due to the government’s cautiousness con-
cerning the dominance of foreign capital in many industries. Later on, especially after 
Deng’s southern tour in 1992, many other industries opened up to foreign investors. With 
more foreign capital entering industries such as manufacturing, retailing, real estate, trans-
portation, and banking, FDI into China began to shift from labor and capital intensive to 
mainly technology-based manufacturing, with increasing shares for the service sectors 
(Figure 2). 
  Similarly, FDI flows into the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
show a steady growth pattern over the last two decades. Beginning in 1989, all CEECs be-
gan a transition from communist central planning economy to free market economy. In the 
area of the former Soviet Union, transition started later, and only the dissolution of the So-
viet Union in 1991 allowed a significant change in the policy. Even then, the early years of 
transition in the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries were hampered by the challenges of 
nation-building. Most FSU countries, with the notable exception of the three Baltic coun-
tries, are still lagging behind the CEECs in implementing reforms.  K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
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  As a result of this profound political and structural change, annual FDI flows into 
the region, of which a majority came from EU countries, began to expand rapidly from a 
low level. However, drastic economic and political reforms in the CEECs at the start of the 
transition caused almost all members to suffer economic recession of varying degrees. 
Consequently, FDI inflows in that period were adversely affected. Starting in 1994, re-
gional FDI picked up, largely due to successful transitions by many of the CEECs. The 
nearly-doubled annual FDI inflows during this period, from $12.3 billion in 1995 to $23.5 
billion in 2000, were mainly induced by large-scale of privatization in the more advanced 
CEECs. For example, the purchase of a majority share in Poland’s Telekomunikacja Pols-
ka by France Telecom for $4 billion in 2000 was one of the largest privatization and FDI 
transactions in the region. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) compiles annual indicators depicting progress in structural reforms related to the 
transition to market economy. EBRD (2007) shows the progress in both large-scale and 
small-scale privatization in our sample countries between 1990 and 2004. (Here a value of 
4.0 denotes the level of reform comparable with a fully functioning market economy and 
1.0 denotes a completely unreformed economy.) In Figure 3 we can see that many coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe had completed the large-scale privatization by the mid-
1990s, while in a few countries the process was still incomplete in the mid-2000s. Howev-
er, it seems that the countries that moved fastest in privatization were also able to attract 
more FDI. 
  With most privatization processes in the region’s advanced economies nearing 
completion, the structure of FDI flows into CEECs was expected to shift from privatization 
towards more technology-intensive greenfield projects and large cross-border mergers & 
acquisitions. This surge of inward FDI also encouraged less developed southeastern Euro-
pean countries to continue with their structural and institutional reforms, which has accele-
rated the liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises and led to reductions in 
corporate tax rates and bigger tax exemptions and other incentives to foreign investors. 
One thing to note is that, even with the rapid growth of FDI into the region, there is still a 
high degree of variation in the distribution of FDI, with disproportionately large shares 
going into the more advanced states (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia). 
Moreover, the sectoral distribution of FDI may differ between the CEECs and China, as 
well as among the CEECs themselves. For example, EBRD (1998) notes that already in BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
1997 some 40-60 per cent of the FDI stock in the CEECs was in the manufacturing sector, 
while the importance of services was increasing rapidly, especially in the more advanced 
countries. 
  During the last 15 years, EU trade and FDI with China has continued to increase. In 
1999, EU-originated FDI accounted for 11 percent of China’s total inflow, making it the 
second largest source after Hong Kong. Meanwhile, due to the geographical and cultural 
proximity between CEECs and the EU, the latter accounted for more than 79 percent of 
CEECs’ FDI inflows in the past 15 years. Thus, both China and CEECs consider the EU 
countries as their major sources of FDI inflows. The similarity between CEECs and China 
is also clear. They were both marked by a central planning economy under communism 
before the transition. Most of the foreign trade was accomplished within the socialist 
block. Starting as early as 1989, they began the transition from central planning to market 
economy. However, there is still a big difference as to the paths taken during the reform. 
While many CEECs adopted a comprehensive economic and political restructuring with a 
precipitate privatization process, China focused more on economic reform alone. This dis-
crepancy, together with other factors such as different host-country comparative advantag-
es, contributes to the variation in FDI recipients and trade patterns between the two re-
gions. As noted in Sachwald (2004) in comparing FDI from the US, Japan and the EU, 
they found that most US and Japanese Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are interested 
in China in the role of manufacturing platform via vertical channels while their European 
counterparts favor a horizontal linkages in their domestic markets. A survey of internation-
al investors also indicates that, among the decisive factors in determining FDI destination, 
a relatively highly skilled labor force in line with production needs in CEECs is the most 
important attribute driving their investments in the region. 
  Meanwhile, the fifth EU enlargement
2 with accession to the Central and Eastern 
European countries brings the opportunity for European investors to extend their opera-
tions in new member states. With access to a larger market and free movement of capital 
and labor resources across member states, foreign investors are more inclined to participate 
in the local economy for reasons of comparative advantages. Early literature has empirical-
ly supported the positive impact of increased integration in the European Union. Norman 
 
2 The European Union has undergone five enlargements, the largest on May 1, 2004, when 8 of 10 new 
members were CEECs - Czech Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
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(1995) showed that the process of regional integration in the EU resulted in rapid growth in 
intra-EU FDI, contributing to the increase in intra-EU FDI from 25 percent of total inward 
stock in 1980 to 40 percent in 1988. Parallel to those studies which focus on the benefits of 
FDI for the host market, recent literature goes the other way by tackling the possible 
crowding out effect of FDI as a result of the fifth EU enlargement. They are particularly 
concerned that too much FDI redistribution from old western members to new eastern ones 
could mean substitutions for those traditional FDI destinations, thus hurting their econo-
mies. Barry and Hannan (2001) and Barry (2002) compare Ireland with new members 
among CEECs and conclude that the similarity between the two when joining the Euro-
pean Union (relatively low economic development level and cheap labor costs compared to 
other member states) can lead the latter to follow a similar development trajectory. In 
terms of FDI substitution, the authors propose two possible directions, both of which have 
found supporting evidence. On one hand, the fifth enlargement contributes to an increase 
in total FDI in both old and new member states. On the other hand, benefiting from tech-
nology spillovers and structural improvement due to FDI, CEECs are now in a better posi-
tion to compete with other old member states, causing a potential diversion of FDI flows. 
Indeed, similar patterns can be expected in other parts of the world as well. 
  Given both China and CEECs’ enlarging share of world FDI and the similarities 
and differences in their economic and institutional reforms, one may wonder whether FDI 
inflows to the two regions are at all correlated, and if so, are they complementary or com-
petitive? It is believed that a clear understanding of the exact relationship between the two 
is not only beneficial to both economists and politicians for research and policy making 
purposes, but also crucial in the current wave of globalization. However, up until recently, 
there has still been insufficient research that makes comparisons between China and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe as favorable targets for global FDI. Empirical studies that try to 
quantify the potential impacts between them are even fewer. In this regard, our paper aims 
to provide an empirical analysis of the above issues. In particular, we want to show wheth-
er China’s continuing economic expansion, by appealing to foreign investors in terms the 
nation’s comparative advantage in labors costs and large market, diverts global FDI from 
CEECs, the so-called hollowing out effect. Or is China’s success in becoming a world cen-
ter for further processing and assembling, while establishing an efficient production net-
work and supply chain and consequently enhancing the productivity of other emerging BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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markets including CEECs, indirectly strengthening the latter’s ability to attract further FDI 
(the case of complementary)? 
 
 
3  Data and methodology 
 
Given the purpose of empirically investigating the correlation between China and Central 
and Eastern European countries in attracting foreign direct investment from the world, a 
model is constructed by regressing host country FDI inflows on the China effect variable 
(here, China's FDI inflows) while controlling for a set of host characteristics. Therefore, a 
statistically significant estimate of the China effect would be considered proof of a strong 
correlation. The data used in the model are panel data spanning the period from 1990 to 
2004 for 15 CEECs. They are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Poland, Romania, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Slovakia and Slovenia. Thus, the number of observations in the panel is 
225 (15×15). We focus on the period starting in 1990 because we believe it fully covers the 
transition period and thus helps us gain a thorough understanding by incorporating time 
trends and growth patterns of FDI inflows in the region. 
With all variables converted to log form except those presented as percentages
3, our 
benchmark regression takes the form 
 
+ + = −
                                                
+ + + +
      (1) 
 
where subscripts i and t denote country i in year t and ui denotes the country-specific ef-
fects and vit the disturbance term. 
Our dependent variable is annual foreign direct investment inflows to the 15 
CEECs. As defined in IMF (1993), direct investment is “investment that is made to acquire 
a lasting interest in an enterprise in an economy other than that of the investor, with a pur-
pose of having an effective voice on the management level.” Such management control 
usually requires a minimum of 10 percent ownership of investors for the investment to be 
 
3 See detailed data description in Appendix. K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
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classified as direct. Our data for FDI inflows are drawn from UNCTAD interactive data-
base. 
The independent variables included in the model are expected to influence individ-
ual host-country FDI inflows through both economic channels, such as foreign trade and 
economic growth, and the environmental channel comprising changes in institutions and 
policy. One thing that interests us most is the use of China’s FDI inflows as a proxy for the 
China Effect. According to Chantasasawat, Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2003), there are two lines 
of reasoning to support the inclusion of this variable. One major objective of foreign direct 
investment is to exploit comparative advantage in a host country. In deciding on invest-
ment destination, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) often choose among several compa-
rable candidates the one with the lowest labor costs. Under this scenario, an increase in 
FDI inflows to the country with the lower labor costs must come at the expense of reducing 
the inflows to others, thus generating a “hollowing out” effect. It is not unusual nowadays 
to hear of concern from various sources that the emergence of China as a top FDI recipient 
diverts FDI flows away from other countries. While this is a major concern, an equally 
strong and empirically sound argument suggests that rapid growth of FDI inflows to one 
country, via production network and supply chain linkages, can stimulate similar growth in 
its neighboring and other economies. With further integration and cooperation across bor-
ders, an increasing portion of the production processes from MNCs now reflect specializa-
tion and fragmentation, which necessitate large investments within a set of production 
networks. Member countries, with their respective advantages across distinct stages of 
production, all benefit from large inflows of foreign investment. Empirical studies in the 
literature present a mixed picture of correlations between country-wise FDI inflows. As 
pointed out in Cravino, et al (2006), the emergence of China in the global economy has had 
positive effects on global FDI flows. Lall and Zhou (2005) suggest that China boosted, ra-
ther than diverting, FDI flows to its neighboring countries. Eichengreen and Tong (2005) 
find that growth in China’s FDI inflows encourages FDI into other Asian countries but di-
verts FDI away from OECD countries. In our case, the above two effects would imply op-
posite signs on the proxy variable, and it remains to be seen which effect stands dominant. 
As mentioned earlier, we can consider this issue by examining three alternative hy-
potheses: China (together with East Asia) and CEECs being in their respective regional 
production network, so that the estimated coefficient of the China effect would be expected BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




to be zero. A second hypothesis is that China and CEECs are in the same global supply 
chain (coefficient of the China variable expected to be positive).  Lastly, China and CEECs 
could be rivals in the eyes of global multinationals, so that the sign of the China effect 
would be negative. 
 Our model also controls for a potential agglomeration effect of FDI in transition 
economies. Various empirical works (Head, Ries and Swenson, 1995) suggest the exis-
tence of an agglomeration effect in most FDI activities. Such an effect obtains when inves-
tors believe they can benefit from herding within the same location. To them, these bene-
fits include (though not limited to a better supplier network) sufficiently skilled labor and 
enhanced productivity, all of which are crucial to profitable long-term investment. Moreo-
ver, accumulation of FDI from investment herding may generate positive feedback on the 
superiority of the local investment environment to potential investors of interest and thus 
lead to more FDI inflows. We use a one-year lagged value of FDI inflows to accommodate 
the agglomeration effect. 
Meanwhile, host-coutry macroeconomic conditions are among the foremost consid-
erations in an MNC’s location decision. Countries with stable economic growth and above-
average market size are more likely to have production capacity and large demand and are 
therefore favored as investment destinations. We consider the host country’s growth of per 
capita real GDP and annual real GDP to be good indicators of its economic growth and 
market size. Data for real GDP and per capita GDP are drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. Real GDP data are measured in constant 2000 US dollars. 
It is well substantiated that country-specific institutional and policy factors are im-
portant to an MNC’s investment location preference. Easy access to market, favorable in-
vestment regulations as well as domestic political stability are all among the prime factors 
for the investment destination. However, to correctly interpret the findings on determinants 
of FDI, one should distinguish between two types of FDI in terms of the motivation. Mar-
ket-seeking or horizontal FDI, with a focus on the market in the host country, chooses local 
production to avoid the associated costs of trade. It is the type that dominated FDI flows in 
the early days and is still important in today’s global economy. Apart from that, is the so-
called cost-minimizing or vertical FDI, in which investors pick investment locations for 
each link of the production chain so as to reduce the overall costs. Hanson, Mataloni and 
Slaughter (2001) indicate that recent surge of FDI inflows, especially to the South, is main-K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
Regional networks, global supply chain or international competitors? 
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ly of the vertical form. A similar conclusion is also found in Markusen and Maskus (1999). 
The different types of FDI will have different implications for location determinants, e.g. 
market size, trade restrictions. In our analysis, trade restrictions are controlled for by in-
cluding both import tariff rates and openness to trade. Import tariff rates are collected from 
IMF Government Finance Statistic Yearbook as well as national statistical agency websites 
and are measured as percent of import tariffs in total revenue from international trade and 
transactions. And openness to trade is calculated as the ratio of country’s trade turnover to 
its GDP. 
In line with the distinction, labor costs, which are considered to be another impor-
tant determinant of investment flows, may also exert a different impact. It is argued that 
vertical FDI, by taking advantage of comparatively low production costs in the host coun-
try, should be negatively related to it. In Bedi and Cieslik (2002), the evidence indicates a 
strong negative correlation between FDI and wage levels in Poland. Hunya (2004) pointed 
that after the first wave of vertical FDI flows into CEECs, FDI has shifted “further East” 
due to increasing labor costs. In the case of horizontal FDI, generally a negative sign 
would again be expected (for cost reasons), albeit this may no longer be the top priority in 
investors' decision making. However, this does not exclude the possibility of positive rela-
tionships in some instances. One would expect a positive sign on wage rate to reflect the 
purchasing power and labor quality of the local market. To control for this factor, we use 
wage rate in manufacturing as a proxy. International Labor Organization’s LABORSTA 
provides data on individual countries’ manufacturing wages in local currencies. We con-
vert the wage rates to US dollars via official average exchange rates from World Develop-
ment Indicators. As to labor quality, we include the illiteracy rate for the host population as 
a proxy. Using illiteracy rate data from United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO)’s Institute for Statistics, we calculate the percentage of people 
aged at least 15 who are illiterate. 
In terms of institutional variables, it is widely accepted that host-country political, 
as well as financial, risk is critical to its overall economic well-being. This is more so in 
our case because almost all CEECs experienced political instability and economic slump at 
the onset of transition. As pointed in Navaretti and Venables (2004) “political risk and in-
stability seems to be an important deterrent to inward FDI”. Henisz (2000) demonstrates 
that political and contractual hazards may go hand in hand since transactions that originally BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




should have been effectively organized through contractual agreements are more likely to 
lead to arbitration or court fights. Equally detrimental to inward FDI growth are host-
country financial instability, corruption and social disorder. Corruption is believed to in-
duce uncertainty over the business environment and to discourage FDI inflows. Lack of 
legality indicates weak protection in case of need and therefore further aggravates the in-
vestment environment. We adopt the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) group in-
dex of political stability risk (PSR) as a proxy for institutional and political quality of the 
host country. The index incorporates 12 risk categories (bureaucratic quality, corruption, 
democratic accountability, ethnic tensions, external conflict, governmental stability, inter-
nal conflict, investment profile, law and order, military in politics, religious tension, and 
socioeconomic conditions) and is calculated as a weighted sum of 100 ( a higher score cor-
responds to less risk and greater stability). 
Tax burden is another factor that concerns potential foreign investors when choos-
ing a location for FDI. As one would expect, a high income tax rate for business might 
mean a narrower profit margin, which could deter FDI. Wei (2000) finds support for a sig-
nificant negative relationship between corporate income tax rate and FDI attraction. 
Another topic of discussion in the literature concerns the host country’s infrastructure qual-
ity. According a survey for the World Investment Directory (2003), large FDI projects are 
partially driven by the infrastructural quality of the host economy. The World Economic 
Forum’s Chief Economist, Augusto Lopez-Claros (2005), has stated that “an inadequate 
supply of infrastructure is rated by business as the biggest obstacle to operation in foreign 
affiliates and improving basic infrastructure would drive up FDI”. Fung, Iizaka and Parker 
(2002) and Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2003) find positive evidence that Chinese provinces with 
better infrastructure are more likely to become FDI destinations. Our data for the corporate 
income tax rate are collected from various issues of Price Waterhouse Cooper’s Worldwide 
Tax Summaries and European Tax Handbook. Our proxy for host-country infrastructure 
quality is the number of telephone mainlines per thousand people, from World Develop-
ment Indicators. 
Factors that control for every host country’s FDI recipients include the current 
global supply characterized by world FDI outflows. Other things equal, a jump in FDI out-
flows worldwide is expected to have a positive effect on FDI inflows to all host countries. K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
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Therefore, annual world FDI outflow is added in our analysis to include this supply side 
effect. Data on world FDI outflows are drawn from the UNTCAD interactive database. 
In addition, the fifth EU enlargement, by granting accession to eight CEECs, is 
likely to be a sign of credibility to foreign investors as regards these countries’ institutional 
and economic reforms. In recognition of their strong improvement, foreign investors are 
more confident about choosing to operate in these economies. In this connection, an acces-
sion dummy is constructed, taking the value of 1 for each of the eight CEECs that are 
member states and 0 for the other seven. Since the accession dummy is time invariant, es-
timation for either the fixed-effect model or the first-differenced Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) will eliminate it from the regression. In order to recover the estimates 
for accession, we make a transformation by interacting it with a time trend
4. 
Given the panel structure of our data, a host of methods are available for estimation. 
One common issue that arises in the estimation of panel data is whether the individual ef-
fects are considered “fixed” or “random”. For comparison, we estimate and report both 
fixed and random effects from use of the Generalized Least Squares method. Another 
problem with our analysis is the potential endogeneity of the lagged value of FDI inflow 
and the proxy for the China effect, China's FDI inflows. One can argue that neither varia-
ble is strictly exogenous to the dependent variable, FDI flows into CEECs. Some omitted 
factors can simultaneously affect both variables, making them endogenous and correlated 
with the error term (e.g. a worldwide technology shock that increases FDI into China is 
expected to likewise enhance FDI into CEECs; Eichengreen and Tong (2005) note that an 
improvement in investor sentiment worldwide may be another example of such endogenei-
ty). One solution is to use instrumental variables. In our analysis we adopt the Error Com-
ponent Two Stage Least Squares (EC2SLS) model of Baitagi (1981, 2001), which is the IV 
analog of a random-effects model. In the first stage of EC2SLS, the endogenous variable is 
regressed on all of the exogenous variables in the system, which are modified by the “with-
in” transformation and the “between” transformation, plus any exogenous instruments that 
we use. In the second stage, the outcome variable is regressed on the exogenous variables 
with the predicted value from first stage replacing the endogenous variable. 
Meanwhile, in the context of the endogeneity problem, another estimation method, 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Instrumental Variable estimator for dynamic 
 
4 The accession dummy is country-specific and time-fixed across the period. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




it it t i it u X Y Y Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ −
panels, has been proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This method can yield consistent 
estimates with greater efficiency,
5 and so we apply it to our model. According to the me-




1                                   (2) 
 
where the  s are the first-differenced terms of the corresponding variables in equa-
tion (1), e.g. 
1 , − − = Δ  is the first difference of the dependent variable, FDI flows 
into country i in year t.   is the one-year lagged value of the new dependent variable, 
.   is a vector which includes all the explanatory variables from equation (1). 
t i it it Y Y Y
1 , − Δ t i Y
it Y Δ it X Δ
                                                
The model can be estimated in one or two-stage GMM. The two-stage method in-
volves using the residuals from first stage to compute an optimal weighting matrix, which 
is subsequently applied to the second stage. In the following, we present only the one-stage 
estimates, from which robust standard errors can be constructed. In addition, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) warn against interpretation of coefficients within the two-stage framework, 
due to a likely underestimation of standard errors of the coefficients. In fact, we estimated 
with both methods and the two-stage results were not qualitatively different. To check for 
robustness of the model, we also conducted two specification tests. The first is the Arellano 
and Bond test of second-order correlation in the first-differenced error terms, the SOC test. 
The second is the Sargan test of over-identification, which tests for correlation between the 
instruments that are excluded from the second-stage model and the residuals. Both tests are 




4  Empirical results 
 
Tables 2 to 5 present the parameter estimates for determinants of CEECs’ FDI inflows us-
ing different models: Feasible Generalized Least Squares with fixed effects (FGLS-FE) in 
 
5 The efficiency can be improved by using lagged values of both the instrumented variables and the instru-
ments as additional instruments. For details on GMM estimation, see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 
and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
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Table 2, Feasible Generalized Least Squares with random effects (FGLS-RE) in Table 3
6, 
Error Correction Two Stage Least Squares (EC2SLS) and Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) in Tables 4 and 5. Columns I through VI in each table compare results for 
the various specifications. 
Our results produce a positive coefficient of China FDI inflows for all models ex-
cept those for GMM, which are negative but insignificant. The coefficient is strongly sig-
nificant and positive within the fixed-effect framework. This implies that FDI inflows to 
China and the Central and Eastern European countries are not, as certain scholars and poli-
ticians may have worried, strongly competing against each other. Rather, as indicated by 
the mostly positive estimates, they may even at some point work as complements. Conse-
quently, strong growth of China’s inward FDI should not be taken as a menace to CEECs 
in crowding out the FDI flows into the region. However, the loose relationship between the 
two streams of FDI may result from the relatively long distance between the two regions. 
As indicated in trade theory, geographic distance between two parties weakens bilateral 
trade, as trade costs and other barriers tend to rise. It may be true that both geographic dis-
tance and cultural difference between China and CEECs contribute to their unique 
attributes as hosts for FDI, and therefore foreign investors in general do not necessarily 
consider the two markets as competitors. 
Another possible explanation for the loose connection lies in the different types of 
FDI that dominate in the two markets. On one hand, as documented in various studies (Na-
varetti and Venables, 2004), horizontal-type FDI, which is mainly for market-seeking, is 
believed to be prevalent among the transition economies. On the other hand, due to its rela-
tive low cost of labor, China is believed to have an ever growing presence of vertical FDI, 
whose main purpose is to minimize global production costs across all stages. Their focus 
on different goals led foreign investors to choose each market accordingly without neces-
sarily placing one as a substitute for the other. 
Across all specifications, lagged FDI is strongly significant and positive, indicating 
a well-founded self-reinforcing effect of the dependent variable’s past value on its current 
value. Since FDI is considered to be long-term capital investment and irreversible in the 
short run, foreign investors are more cautious about the destination. When the host market 
has successfully obtained numbers of large establishments via foreign investors, potential 
 
6 The Hausman test indicates the superiority of the Fixed-effect over Random-effect model, though both re-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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investors generally consider this a sign of a sound investment environment. To them, such 
establishments could also be associated with positive externalities in the host country such 
as technology spillovers, advanced labor skills and efficient production and supplier net-
work, which can lead to further FDI inflows through a positive feedback channel. In line 
with recent empirical findings in support of the agglomeration effect in the U.S. (Wheeler 
and Mody, 1992) and Japanese FDI (Head, Ries, and Swenson 1995), this study suggests 
that the same effect also exists in transition economies. This partly explains why the rela-
tively advanced economies in the region, which began FDI absorption much earlier than 
the others, continue to attract much larger shares of FDI flows into the region. 
The other variables generally get the expected signs. With country size proxied by 
GDP level, its coefficient is consistently positive and strongly significant at the 1% level 
across all models. As the literature suggests that horizontal FDI is more attracted to host 
countries with large markets, our result seems to be consistent with the early finding of 
dominant horizontal FDI among CEECs. The variable WFDI, which uses world FDI out-
flows to capture the supply-side effect on CEECs’ FDI inflows, carries a positive sign and 
is significant for the various specifications. It is in our belief that the inclusion of this glob-
al supply control factor avoids a possible upward bias in the estimation of the China effect. 
Our results show that openness to trade is mainly positive and strongly correlated 
with FDI inflows. Since the variable is known as an indicator of a liberal trade environ-
ment in the host country, its positive estimate implies that fewer regulatory restrictions and 
trade barriers tend to facilitate international trade and promote FDI flows. One thing to 
note is that, although our results support a significantly positive correlation, the coefficient 
is small in magnitude, some estimates even being negative. In fact, in the empirical litera-
ture on FDI, a negative impact of openness to trade on FDI has been found in a number of 
studies. One possible explanation, as pointed in Hausmann and Fernandez (2000), is that 
openness to trade correlates with the degree of sophistication of the host financial system, 
which in turn might be negatively correlated with FDI. The small magnitude of the coeffi-
cient may be a result of this. 
Manufacturing wage rate, a proxy for labor costs, carries a negative but usually in-
significant sign. A strong negative coefficient on wage rates would imply dominance of 
vertical FDI in host market. However, as suggested by the previous analysis, FDI into 
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CEECs is predominantly horizontal, with a focus on market penetration. As a result, labor 
costs are more likely to be downplayed by foreign investors who are mainly interested in 
accessing larger markets and seeking efficiency. To them, labor quality in the host market, 
a critical factor for operational productivity and efficiency, is of much greater relevance. In 
line with this reasoning, our labor quality variable, proxied by illiteracy rate, is found to be 
negative and significant. Thus a low level of skilled labor, indicated by a high illiteracy 
rate, tends to deter FDI inflows, reflecting the importance of labor quality in determining 
CEECs' FDI inflows. 
In the literature, a tariff is often considered an integral part of trade costs, which are 
found to have a significant impact on FDI flows. However, on the aggregate level, their 
sign becomes ambiguous due to the opposite effects on horizontal and vertical FDI. Specif-
ically, they tend to attract horizontal FDI for domestic market penetrating purposes, but to 
repel vertical FDI due to cost concerns. Thus the sign will depend on which kind of FDI is 
dominant in the particular host country. Our results show a consistently positive though 
insignificant estimate, once again suggesting the dominance of horizontal FDI for transi-
tion economies. The tax burden, proxied by the corporate income tax rate, while obtaining 
the right sign, seems to have only a marginal effect on FDI. One possible explanation, ac-
cording to an OECD study (2003), is that tax incentives may in certain cases be inefficient 
in promoting FDI. As they found in their report, large MNCs are becoming more adept at 
alleviating their own tax burdens through sophisticated tax planning well before the opera-
tion. As a result, those tax incentives offered by a host country often lose their importance 
over time, and so are ignored. In the extreme, they may even be counterproductive, since 
these tax policies are considered to be nontransparent, insecure or bureaucratically infeasi-
ble. 
There is evidence that the political and institutional stability of a host country can 
boost foreign investors’ confidence. Our proxy, the ICRG political stability risk index, car-
ries a positive sign across all models and is strongly significant for the fixed-effect model. 
This finding is consistent with the literature, as the index assigns a higher score to those 
countries with political and financial stability, efficient institutional structure and strong 
law enforcement, all of which enhance FDI attraction. 
Main telephone lines per thousand people as a proxy for host-country infrastructure 
quality, is statistically insignificant and seems to carry the wrong sign. A possible reason BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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lies in the fading importance of traditional communication technique in the face of current 
innovations. Our positive coefficient on the accession dummy indicates that the fifth EU 
enlargement does help new members in the region to attract more FDI. Admission of a 
CEEC to the EU can be considered a worldwide recognition of the country’s success in its 
political and economic reforms. As a result, foreign investors feel more comfortable about 
investing in those markets, due to favorable investment environments. 
In general, we do not find any crowding out effect of China FDI on the Central and 
Eastern European countries. In some cases, China's FDI inflows may even to induce more 
FDI into the region. Our results also show that, of the determinants, the host country’s 
market size, trade environment, as well as its labor quality, all have a strong influence on 
FDI flows into CEECs. 
 
 
5  Robustness checks 
 
The GMM estimation procedure aims to correct for the potential endogeneity problem. To 
ensure the appropriateness of our model under GMM, we need to verify that there is no 
second-order serial correlation of first-differenced error terms and the instrument sets used 
in the estimation are properly specified. For this purpose, two tests are performed: the Alle-
rano & Bond second-order correlation (SOC) test and the Sargan test. The p-value from 
Table 5 for both the SOC test (null of no correlation) and Sargan test (null of no instrument 
misspecification) indicate that neither of the null hypotheses can be rejected. Thus the re-
sults confirm the properness of our interpretation for the GMM framework. 
To further test the robustness of our model, we try re-estimate by dropping individ-
ual countries from our sample, one at a time. It turns out that the major conclusion remains 
valid. China FDI inflows are not growing at the expense of FDI flows into Central and 
Eastern Europe. Market size, degree of trade liberalization, as well as labor quality remains 
significant in guiding FDI location choices among CEECs. In order to take a closer look at 
the impact of host-country political and institutional environment, we replace the ICRG 
index PSR with three separate indicators, namely, Corruption, Law and order, and Gov-
ernment stability. A higher score in each category corresponds to above-average quality of 
host market in that respect. Again, the results are similar to the previous estimates, with K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
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positive signs on each individual category. And our results for the China effect remain un-
changed. 
Additionally, in an attempt to control for a possible contagious effect of the finan-
cial crises in Asia in 1997 and later in Russia in 1998 on CEECs, we add a dummy varia-
ble, crisis, which takes the value 1 for year 1997 and year 1998 and 0 otherwise. The result 
looks compelling. The significant and negative coefficient suggests that the two consecu-
tive financial crises, by severely hurting the global banking system and capital markets, 
lessened foreign investors’ willingness and capability to invest in CEECs. However, inclu-
sion of the dummy does not change our findings regarding the China effect. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
China’s emergence as a leading recipient of FDI in the world follows its implementation of 
an open door policy and market economy reform over the last three decades. The success-
ful transition experience of many Central and Eastern European countries also enables 
them to attract an increasing share of foreign investment from the world, particularly from 
the European Union. At the same time, results from existing studies strongly suggest that 
FDI into emerging economies often serves to facilitate the operation of production net-
works. Given these different but related global trends, what is the relationship between FDI 
into China and FDI into the CEECs?  We hypothesize three possible relationships: China 
and CEECs are in different distinct regional production networks, implying that the impact 
of China on FDI into CEECs is zero; or China and CEECs jointly participate in a global 
supply chain, so that FDI into China and into the CEECs are positively related; or MNCs 
may view China and CEECs as rival production sites, so that the China effect on FDI into 
CEECs is negative.  
 Despite its significant academic and policy implications, the question we pose here 
remains unresolved due to a lack of related empirical work. In this paper, we employ panel 
data to study this so-called China effect in detail. Specifically, we compare empirical esti-
mates for 15 Central and Eastern European countries over a 15-year period from 1990-
2004, using four different econometric approaches: FGLS with Random effects, FGLS 
with fixed effects, EC2SLS and GMM. Our key empirical result is that generally the China 
effect variable is insignificant.  When the variable is significant, the sign of the coefficient BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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is positive. This result supports the general conclusion that there is only a weak relation-
ship between FDI into China and FDI into the CEECs.  In some regressions, FDI into Chi-
na and FDI into CEECs are positively and significantly related. In other words, there is 
some evidence that China and CEECs are a global supply chain. 
It can be argued that with certain Central and Eastern European countries having 
relatively highly-skilled labor forces and China one of the world’s largest markets with rel-
atively low-cost labor, the large MNCs may choose to fragment their production processes 
into both locations in order to better accommodate the local demand and their increasingly 
sophisticated global supply chains. To this extent, our results might be considered as fur-
ther support for the claim that China and the Central and Eastern European countries, by 
undergoing the market economy transition through different approaches, are becoming 
integral to the global production network. It can also be mentioned that FDI into the 
CEECs has been more dominated by service sector investments than has FDI into China, 
which is of course another indication of the different strategies chosen by the MNCs for 
these markets. Meanwhile, our analysis confirms the predominance of host-country charac-
teristics such as market size, degree of trade liberalization and labor quality, as well as a 
global-wise healthy capital market, in promoting FDI flows. We think that these findings 
provide some helpful policy implications for the Central and Eastern European countries 
for becoming attractive FDI destinations. K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
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Figure 1  FDI inflows and FDI stock in China, 1980-2005 
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Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report online database. 
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Figure 2  Distribution of China FDI stock by industry and country of origin, 1990-2004 
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Figure 3  EBRD indicator of progress in large-scale privatization 
 










































Source: EBRD, 2007. 
 
Figure 4   FDI inflows/stock to China and 15 CEECs as percent of world total, 1990-2005. K.C. Fung, Iikka Korhonen, Ke Li and Francis Ng  China and Central and Eastern European Countries:  
Regional networks, global supply chain or international competitors? 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
FDI†  202 1130 1850 0.01  12600
CFDI†  225 34900 16000 3490 54900
GPCGR  211 2.346 9.967 -31.34 86.35
GDP†  218 27100 37000 1120  192000
WFDI†  225 537000 319000 188000  1240000
WAGE 161  295.833 206.572 32.72  1174.9
INCTAX 126  29.892 8.219 5  45
TARIFF  139 4.141 3.781 0 18.57
OPEN  211 96.803 32.765 34.82 180.36
ILLIT  170 2.711 4.905 0.2 23.04
PSR 155  70.229 10.713 26  87
TELE 220  238.424 99.738 12.16  424.91
†: in millions 
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Table 2  Dependent variable: Inward FDI (Fixed-effect) 
 





































































































































Obs. 157  132 101 62 99  61
R-squared 0.707 0.792 0.807 0.802 0.803 0.794
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Table 3  Dependent variable: Inward FDI (Random-effect) 
 





































































































































Obs. 157  132 101 62 99  61
R-squared 0.672 0.669 0.625 0.587 0.619 0.583
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Table 4  Dependent variable: Inward FDI (EC2SLS) 
 





































































































































Obs. 147  123 93 59 93  59
R-squared 0.706 0.782 0.804 0.806 0.806 0.806
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Table 5  Dependent variable: Inward FDI (GMM) 
 





































































































































Obs. 157  132 101 62 99  61
Sargan 
test 
0.040 0.483 0.480 0.473 0.480 0.473
SOC test  0.472  0.387 0.660 0.097 0.541  0.095
 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respective-
ly. Sargan test (p-value): null hypothesis is no misspecification with instrument sets. SOC test (p-value): null 
hypothesis of no second-order correlation in differenced errors. Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
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